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This chapter discusses the history of Ashʿarism in the fourth to ﬁfth/tenth to
eleventh centuries. Ashʿarism was, besides Māturīdism, the most important
school of Sunni kalām. After the decline of Muʿtazilism, it became the pre-
dominant theological school, primarily among the adherents of the Shāﬁʿite
and the Mālikite school of law. There is a wide scholarly consensus that
Ashʿarism entered a new phase in the sixth/twelfth century, marked by an
increasing inﬂuence of Avicennan philosophy, a transition generally associated
with the prominent thinker Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī. This chapter focuses on
theologians that preceded this methodological shift. It ﬁrst charts the rise of
Ashʿarism, highlighting the contributions of three key ﬁgures to the elaboration
and broader dissemination of the school’s teachings: Abū Bakr Ibn Fūrak, Abū
Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī, and Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī. It concludes with an assessment
of Ashʿarism under the patronage of Niẓām al-Mulk.
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Ashʿarism was, besides Māturīdism, the most important school of Sunni kalām.
After the decline of Muʿtazilism, it became the predominant theological school,
primarily among the adherents of the Shāﬁʿite and the Mālikite school of law.
The inﬂuence of Ashʿarite teaching can still be felt in modern thought. This
chapter intends to give an outline of approximately the ﬁrst two centuries of the
school’s history. There is a wide scholarly consensus that during the next, that
is the sixth/twelfth century, Ashʿarism entered a new phase that was marked
by an increasing inﬂuence of Avicennan philosophy. The transition to this new
phase is generally associated with the prominent thinker Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī
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(d. 505/1111). This periodization of the development of Ashʿarism has also a
long tradition inMuslim historiography: it was the famous North African scholar
Ibn Khaldūn (d. 808/1406) who referred to the pre- and post-Ghazālian theolo-
gians as ‘the earlier ones’ (al-mutaqaddimūn) and ‘the later ones’ (al-mutaʾakhkhirūn).
It is roughly with Ibn Khaldūn’s ‘earlier’ representatives of Ashʿarism that we are
concerned in this chapter. A number of modern scholars have referred to this
period as that of ‘classical Ashʿarism’ (e.g. Frank 1989a; Frank 1992: 18; Frank
2000; Frank 2004; Shihadeh 2012). Yet the representatives of this period did
not propagate a homogeneous set of doctrines: a number of case studies have
shown that Ashʿarite teachings were subject to constant developments and revi-
sions, and that the introduction of philosophical ideas, a shift generally identiﬁed
with al-Ghazālī, even started with earlier theologians.
I. The Rise of Ashʿarism
If we can trust historical reports, the history of Ashʿarism beganwith amemorable
symbolic act. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935–6), a Muʿtazilite theologian
with high renown, is said to have publicly broken with the doctrines of his school
on a Friday in the Great Mosque of Basra. It is hardly possible to authenticate the
vivid reports about al-Ashʿarī’s ‘conversion’ and to answer the question whether
they reliably reﬂect the historical details. The little we know about the biography
of the founder of Ashʿarismwidely relies on accounts with a strong hagiographical
ﬂavour.1
Al-Ashʿarī was born c. 260/874 in Basra. The city was one of the oldest cen-
tres of kalām and, more particularly, of Muʿtazilite teaching. Muʿtazilism was the
dominant doctrine during al-Ashʿarī’s lifetime. He became a talented student
of one of the leading Muʿtazilite theologians of that era, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʾī (d.
303/915). With Abū ʿAlī as his master, al-Ashʿarī experienced a crucial phase
in the evolution of the discipline of kalām. Down to the third/ninth century,
Muʿtazilite teaching was merely an intellectual endeavour of individual thinkers.
With Abū ʿAlī and his counterpart Abū l-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī (d. 319/931),
however, two representatives of a new generation of theologians formulated sys-
tematic doctrinal frameworks and thereby laid the foundation for the emergence
of the Basran and the Baghdadi school of the Muʿtazila. Al-Ashʿarī was conse-
quently still highly familiar with the earlier phase of kalām and its theological dis-
cussions. His doxography on the ‘Doctrines of the Muslims’ (Maqālāt al-islāmiyyīn)
is therefore the most comprehensive and reliable source on this era that has come
down to us (al-Ashʿarī, Maqālāt).
When al-Ashʿarī broke with Muʿtazilite teaching, he was about 40 years old.
Despite the expectable hostilities from his former fellows, he went on living in
Basra, before he eventually settled in Baghdad, where he remained for the rest of
1The most important historical accounts of Ashʿarism and its theologians are Ibn ʿAsākir’s (d.
571/1176) Tabyīn kadhib al-muftarī (Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabyīn) and al-Subkī’s (d. 771/1370) Ṭabaqāt al-shāﬁʿiyya
al-kubrā (al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt); both authors lived in Damascus. The Andalusī Aḥmad b. Yūsuf al-Lablī
also compiled a collection of bibliographies of Ashʿarite theologians (al-Lablī, Fihrist).
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his life (Allard 1965: 25–47; Gimaret 1997b; van Ess 2011: i. 454–501).
After his rupture with Muʿtazilism, al-Ashʿarī adopted the major tenets of
the opposing doctrinal camp, the Sunni Traditionalists. However, despite many
doctrinal overlaps they divided over a very central issue. Essentially, they irrec-
oncilably disagreed over the question of whether human reason is a means of
knowing theological truths: whereas the Traditionalists completely rejected ratio-
nal speculation, al-Ashʿarī distinguished between two major ﬁelds of knowledge
and claimed that each of them requires its own epistemological method.
On the one hand, he approved of the Traditionalists’ rejection of the Muʿ-
tazilites’ ethical objectivism. In other words, he agreed that man has no intel-
lectual capacity to distinguish between good and evil. As a proponent of ethical
subjectivism, he posited that the morally good is whatever God commands and
that the evil is whatever He forbids. The upshot of this theory was that since
morality is not based on rationalized principles, man depends on divine instruc-
tion by way of revelation in order to knowGod’s obligations and prohibitions and
to act in a morally good way (Frank 1983a: 207–10; Gimaret 1990: 444–5).
Beyond the question of knowing man’s obligations, however, al-Ashʿarī ap-
proved of dialectical reasoning on theological questions: he afﬁrmed that knowl-
edge of God can only be gained by rational reﬂection. In this respect, he agreed
with Muʿtazilite teaching. This legitimation of the methodology of kalām was
in fundamental contradiction to the principles of the Sunni Traditionalists. Al-
Ashʿarī even posited that individual reﬂection about God is man’s ﬁrst religious
obligation. However, it is crucially important to understand how al-Ashʿarī de-
fended this theory: he argued that man’s duty to reﬂect about God is made known
by revelation, just as is the case with all divine commandments. In this sense, al-
Ashʿarī still maintained the primacy of revelation over rational reﬂection (Frank
1989a: 44–6; Gimaret 1990: 211–18; Rudolph 1992: 73–8).2
Despite al-Ashʿarī’s agreement with the Sunni Traditionalists on many doc-
trines, they consequently strongly disapproved of his method. Now since the
Muʿtazilites severely criticized his theological positions, al-Ashʿarī came under at-
tack from two diametrically opposed sides. This is aptly illustrated by al-Ashʿarī’s
2The question whether al-Ashʿarī remained after his ‘conversion’ a real mutakallim was subject to
some discussion in modern scholarship. G. Makdisi (1962; 1963) argued that the doctrinal tradi-
tionalism expressed in al-Ashʿarī’s al-Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna is in no way consistent with the manifesto
for the practice of kalām as found in al-Ḥathth ʿalā l-baḥth (alternatively entitled Istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm
al-kalām; see Frank 1988), which is equally attributed to al-Ashʿarī. He concluded that the image
of al-Ashʿarī as the founder of a new school of kalām is anachronistic and merely the product of the
school’s later narrative. Consequently, such works as Ibn ʿAsākir’s Tabyīn al-muftarī and al-Subkī’s
Ṭabaqāt al-shāﬁʿiyya al-kubrā—which both present al-Ashʿarī as a defender of traditionalist doctrines via
rational argumentation—should be read as attempts to advocate the practice of kalām and to seek legit-
imization within the Sunni mainstream, primarily among the adherents of the Shāﬁʿite school of law.
Makdisi therefore doubted the authenticity of al-Ḥathth and suggested that the text cannot be earlier
than al-Subkī. Against Makdisi, R. M. Frank (1991) claimed that al-Ḥathth is authentic. He argues
that the difference between al-Ibāna and al-Ḥathth is one of form rather than of incoherent doctrinal
positions. Consequently, the two texts are not in conﬂict with each other, nor with al-Ashʿarī’s other
texts—most importantly his Lumaʿ, an undisputedly authentic kalām work. Today, Frank’s position
represents the wide scholarly consensus. More recently, Zahrī (2013) argued that it is in fact the Ibāna
that cannot be authentic.
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understanding of God’s attributes: on the one hand, he strove to interpret the
Qurʾān as literally and faithfully as possible. This also had signiﬁcant implications
for his interpretation of predications made about God: if the revelation speaks
of God’s knowledge, power etc., al-Ashʿarī infers that God really has knowledge,
power etc. Accordingly, he conceives of these attributes as co-eternal entities that
subsist in God.
This was in line with the position of the Traditionalists, but raised much objec-
tions amongst the Muʿtazilites. They criticized that his teaching was tantamount
to claiming the existence of eternal beings apart from God; in their eyes, this
undermined the very principle of monotheism. As a mutakallim, al-Ashʿarī did,
however, not refrain from providing a rational explanation to resolve such logi-
cal problems. After all, he was convinced that God’s revelation can be explained
by human reason. In other words, he rejected the Traditionalists’ so-called bi-lā
kayf -approach, that is their dismissal of any attempt to rationalize why their doc-
trinal claims should be true. Al-Ashʿarī’s solution to the Muʿtazilites’ objection
was to claim that God’s eternal attributes are neither identical, nor other than
Him (Gimaret 1990: 276–81). In order to prove that God actually has eternal
entitative attributes, he went on arguing that predications like ‘x knows’ or ‘x
is powerful’ always refer to the same reality or truth (ḥaqīqa): if human beings
described as knowing or powerful merit such descriptions by virtue of an entity
(maʿnā) of knowledge or power, the same must be true for God (Frank 1982a: 270).
Another well-known example of al-Ashʿarī’s controversial approach was his
theory of human acts. Again, his reﬂections departed from a supposition he
shared with the Traditionalists: both claimed that God’s omnipotence cannot
be restricted in any way, and so whatever happens in the world depends on Him.
Consequently, human actions—which belong to these worldly events—must be
created and controlled by God (Gimaret 1990: 378–9; Perler and Rudolph 2000:
51–6). For the Muʿtazilites, this line of reasoning makes nonsense of the fun-
damental idea that man is individually responsible for his acts. Yet al-Ashʿarī
countered this objection by developing an alternative conception of human self-
determination that does not depend on the veracity of freedom of action.
A central element of al-Ashʿarī’s solution to the problem consisted in his dis-
tinction between two types of human acts. We have a clear awareness, he says, of
the fact that we cannot refrain from performing such motions as trembling: con-
sequently, we all know that speciﬁc acts occur necessarily (iḍṭirāran). He then goes
on to argue that we intuitively distinguish other motions, like, for example, our
walking. Since necessary acts imply our weakness (ʿajz), all other acts must involve
our ‘power’ (quwwa or qudra). Al-Ashʿarī labelled these non-necessary acts with the
term ‘acquisition’ (kasb/iktisāb), a notion that had already been used by some ear-
lier theologians. According to al-Ashʿarī, it is precisely for these ‘acquired’ acts
that we are accountable, even if we have no power to act otherwise than we do. It
would seem that al-Ashʿarī justiﬁed man’s moral responsibility in the absence of
freedom by the claim that we act according to our willing and wanting whenever
we perform an ‘acquired’ act (Gimaret 1980: 80–1; Gimaret 1990: 131, 387–96;
Thiele in press).
Only a handful of al-Ashʿarī’s writings have survived while most of the more
4
than 100 titles he wrote are missing (Gimaret 1985a).3 Therefore, modern re-
search on al-Ashʿarī’s theology largely depends on second-hand information from
later sources, the most important being Abū Bakr Ibn Fūrak’s (d. 406/1015)Mu-
jarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī (‘Excerpts (?) from al-Ashʿarī’s doctrines’) (Gimaret 1985b).
Consequently, some caution is required when interpreting al-Ashʿarī’s original
thought and a number of questions cannot be satisfactorily answered.
II. Dissemination and Consolidation
According to present knowledge, the generation after the school’s eponym did
not bring forth any prominent scholar who signiﬁcantly advanced the school’s
teachings. Yet its transmission eastwards began as early as with a number of al-
Ashʿarī’s own students: since many of them hailed from Nīsābūr, the economic
and intellectual centre of Khurāsān, they returned back home after their teacher’s
death and laid the foundation for the city’s Ashʿarite community (Allard 1965:
314).
During the following generation, however, three towering theologians of the
later fourth/tenth century made outstanding contributions to the elaboration
and broader dissemination of the school’s teachings: their names were Abū Bakr
Ibn Fūrak, Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī (d. 411/1020), and Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d.
403/1013). All three theologians studied kalām with al-Ashʿarī’s former student
Abū l-Ḥasan al-Bāhilī (d. c. 370/980) and became instrumental in the scholastic
consolidation of Ashʿarite thought. Since each one of them developed his own
approach, partly under the inﬂuence of regional traditions, their teachings laid
the foundations for an increasing diversity within Ashʿarism.
At the beginning of his scholarly career Ibn Fūrak lived in Iraq and studied
in Baghdad. Then, after having spent some time in Rayy, the Samanid governor
Nāṣir al-Dawla (d. 357–8/968–9) established a madrasa for Ibn Fūrak in Nīsābūr.
We know a number of works he wrote in the ﬁeld of theology, and some of them
have even survived to the present day: Ibn Fūrak composed a commentary upon
al-Ashʿarī’s al-Lumaʿ (lost), a collection of deﬁnitions of technical terms in kalām
and legal methodology, entitled al-Ḥudūd fī l-uṣūl (Abdel-Haleem 1991; Ibn Fūrak,
Ḥudūd), the above-mentioned account of al-Ashʿarī’s doctrines (Ibn Fūrak, Mujar-
rad), and some additional works that are still in manuscript form. Yet, Ibn Fūrak
is particularly known for a book entitled Kitāb (Taʾwīl) Mushkil al-ḥadīth (Ibn Fūrak,
Mushkil). In this text, Ibn Fūrak discusses anthropomorphic expressions found in
prophetic traditions and attempts to interpret these texts allegorically. It would
seem that Ibn Fūrak wrote this work in the context of his polemical encounters
with the Karrāmiyya, a sect with some inﬂuence in Nīsābūr. They considered
God as a substrate (maḥall) of accidents and therefore claimed that He is a ‘sub-
stance’ (jawhar) or body (jism). As a result, they were widely blamed as anthro-
pomorphists (see Chapter 15). Hence, Ibn Fūrak’s Mushkil al-ḥadīth may be read
in the light of this speciﬁc conﬂict (Allard 1965: 326–9). The treatise opens with
3The most important surviving kalām treatise composed by al-Ashʿarī himself is his Kitāb al-Lumaʿ ;
a critical edition and English translation of this text is found in McCarthy (1953).
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some chapters that are related to themore narrow topics of kalām, including God’s
oneness and singularity, or the meaning of His names and attributes (Allard 1965:
314–15; Montgomery Watt 1978; Brown 2007: 190–1).
Ibn Fūrak’s contemporary Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī hailed from Isfarāʾīn. He
spent many years studying in Baghdad, before he returned to his home city, where
he taught for some time. Like Ibn Fūrak, he eventually received an invitation
from scholars of Nīsābūr to teach at a madrasa speciﬁcally built for him. Report-
edly, al-Isfarāʾīnī’s teachings were sometimes fairly close to Muʿtazilite positions:
in this context, secondary sources refer to such topics as his theory of knowledge,
prophethood, the nature of the Qurʾān or human acts. Yet our sources about
his theology are very limited: apart from a short creed (ʿaqīda) al-Isfarāʾīnī’s legal
and theological writings are no longer extant (Frank 1989b). However, his teach-
ings are often quoted in the later Ashʿarite literature—a number of his works
are even known by title, including al-Jāmiʿ fī uṣūl al-dīn wa-l-radd ʿalā l-mulḥidīn (‘A
compendium of the principles of religion and a refutation of the atheists’), Kitāb
al-Asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt (‘Book of the (divine) names and attributes’), and Mukhtaṣar fī
l-radd ʿalā ahl al-iʿtizāl wa-l-qadar (‘Brief refutation of the Muʿtazila and the pro-
ponents of human free will’). These frequent quotations are an indication for
al-Isfarāʾīnī’s popularity and his lasting inﬂuence among later generations of the-
ologians (Madelung 1978; Frank 1989b; Brown 2007: 189–90; Brodersen 2008).
In later sources, al-Isfarāʾīnī’s positions were often contrasted with those of
al-Bāqillānī. Usually, the latter is presented as rather inclined towards the tra-
ditionalism of the school’s founding father. As an intellectual, al-Bāqillānī must
have been appreciated beyond the mere Sunni mainstream: he was even invited
to join the court of the Būyids in Baghdad, who were Shīʿites. His patron, ʿAḍud
al-Dawlā appointed him judge and even sent him on a diplomatic mission to the
Byzantine court (Allard 1965: 290–5; Ibish 1965).
Among the three theologians of his generation, al-Bāqillānī’s theological
teaching is the best known. Comparatively much of his work has survived to
the present date. These texts include a comprehensive manual of theological
polemics, entitled Kitāb al-Tamhīd fī l-radd ʿalā l-mulḥida al-muʿaṭṭila wa-l-rāﬁḍa wa-l-
khawārij wa-l-muʿtazila.4 It bears witness to al-Bāqillānī’s attempt to systematically
compile and coherently organize the teachings of his predecessors (Eichner
2009: 160–4). It has been convincingly argued that this book was in fact
one of al-Bāqillānī’s early works, possibly written around 360/970 (Gimaret
1970: 76–7; Gimaret 1980: 94–5; Gimaret 2009: 259). A shorter theological
treatise that focuses on disputed questions between Ashʿarism and the Muʿtazila
circulated under two titles, al-Risālā al-Ḥurra and al-Inṣāf fī mā yajibu ʿtiqāduhu wa-lā
yajūzu l-jahl bihi (al-Bāqillānī, Inṣāf ). Much more important and comprehensive in
length is his main work in theology entitled Hidāyat al-mustarshidīn. Originally, the
4Al-Bāqillānī’s Tamhīd was ﬁrst published in 1947 (al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd1); this edition is based on
only one manuscript that happens to be incomplete. Later, R. J. McCarthy critically edited the text
on the basis of additional manuscripts (al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd2), but he omitted almost the whole section
on the imamate. On the basis of these two editions, ʿI. D. A. Ḥaydar published the complete work
(al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd3). Nonetheless, the earlier incomplete editions remain the standard references
in modern scholarship.
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Hidāya must have been a monumental work, comprising at least sixteen volumes,
but only four have as yet been rediscovered. It is in this text that al-Bāqillānī
expounded his original teachings and sometimes revised or further developed a
number of al-Ashʿarī’s positions, including some he had still defended in earlier
works (Gimaret 2009; Schmidtke 2011).
Since the beginnings of Ashʿarite studies, modern scholars have highlighted
al-Bāqillānī’s central role in the consolidation of the school. This perception was
signiﬁcantly shaped by Ibn Khaldūn’s account of the history of Ashʿarism in his
Muqaddima. Although Ibn Khaldūn’s report includes some imprecisions, it is be-
yond any doubt that al-Bāqillānī signiﬁcantly contributed to the evolution of the
school’s teachings by broadening its conceptual framework and by further de-
veloping ideas of the school’s founder. In the Hidāya, for example, al-Bāqillāni
applies to God the term of the ‘necessarily existent’ (wājib al-wujūd).5 The phrase
is primarily known as a central notion in Avicenna’s metaphysics—as the coun-
terpart of mumkin al-wujūd, which refers to the contingent world—but the term
already appeared in the philosophical milieu of fourth/tenth-century Baghdad,
where al-Bāqillānī might possibly have become familiar with it.
A famous example for how al-Bāqillānī further developed Ashʿarite teaching
by borrowing concepts from other, including rival, schools is his adaption of the
Muʿtazilite theory of ‘state’ (ḥāl). Al-Bāqillānī’s opinion with regard to the notion
of ḥāl was not consistent. In his Kitāb al-Tamhīd, he still refutes the concept. Yet
in his later magnum opus in theology, the Hidāya, he revised his earlier position.
The reason behind this was that he apparently felt that the traditional Ashʿarite
teaching on attributes was, in some respect, incoherent.
It would seem that al-Bāqillānī was concerned with what he identiﬁed as a
weakness in al-Ashʿarī’s proof for God’s entitative attributes, such as knowledge,
power, etc. As mentioned before, al-Ashʿarī’s argument was based on the claim
that such expressions as ‘he is knowing’ always express the same meaning or truth
(ḥaqīqa): if man is knowing by virtue of an entity (maʿnā) of knowledge, the same
must be true for God. Al-Bāqillānī drew on this line of reasoning and went on
arguing that there must be a correlation (taʿalluq) between that which is expressed
by our predicating ‘x is knowing’ and the entity of knowledge. Against al-Ashʿarī,
however, al-Bāqillānī came to the conclusion that the predication ‘being know-
ing’ (kawnuhu ʿāliman) cannot refer to the same as the noun ‘knowledge’ (ʿilm). For
if ‘being knowing’ referred to an entity of knowledge and not to a reality distinct
from this entity, one would attempt to prove the existence of entitative knowledge
by itself. Al-Bāqillānī therefore concludes that such predications as ‘being know-
ing’ refer to a ḥāl. According to his understanding, this ḥāl is grounded in, and, at
the same time, evidence for, the existence of an entity of knowledge. Al-Bāqillānī
consequently relied on the concept to prove the existence of entitative attributes
5See Ms. St Petersburg, The Institute of Oriental Manuscripts of the Russian Academy of Sci-
ences, C329, fos. 32b–33a, where al-Bāqillānī describes God’s existence as ‘His being eternal [and]
necessarily existent, for ever and always’ (kawnuhu qadīman wājib al-wujūd abadan wa-dāʾiman); and Ms.
Tashkent, al-Biruni Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Uzbekistan,
3296, fo. 20b: ‘the Eternal’s existence is necessary under all circumstances’ (al-qadīm wajib wujūdihi fī
kull ḥāl).
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in God that, like Him, are eternal. Furthermore, al-Bāqillānī’s adoption of the
notion of ḥāl had also implications for his metaphysical conception of the created
world, since he also applied it to predications we make about created beings (see
Chapter 22).
Al-Bāqillānī furthermore attempted to achieve greater coherency with regard
to the Ashʿarite teaching on human acts, the framework of which was laid down
by al-Ashʿarī’s theory of ‘acquisition’ (kasb). Al-Bāqillānī revised some aspects of
the theory by addressing, primarily in theHidāya, a number of questions that seem
to have been unresolved by the school’s founder. However, he stuck to al-Ashʿarī’s
central claim: man’s moral accountability does not depend on freedom of action
being true. Yet against al-Ashʿarī, al-Bāqillānī explicitly rejects the assumption
that our acting intentionally, that is our ‘acquiring’ speciﬁc acts, depends in any
way on our will being involved. For him, this claim is established by the fact that
we sometimes fail to exercise our will—which is always the case with ‘compelled
acts’. As a logical corollary, he goes on to argue, that our incapacity to do what
we want reveals a lack of power. Consequently, the opposite must be true for all
other acts: they occur by virtue of man’s power.
Beyond al-Ashʿarī’s reasoning, al-Bāqillānī asked, however, about the precise
function of man’s power in our performing ‘acquired’ acts. While al-Ashʿarī con-
tented himself to afﬁrm that ‘acquired’ acts are merely conjoined by an accident
of power in the agent’s body, al-Bāqillānī formulated the theory that man’s power
really has an effect (taʾthīr). He actually proposes different approaches to explain
how our power affects our acting. His ﬁrst explanation as to the effectiveness of
human power is in line with his conception of the reality that underlies our pred-
ications about beings: as mentioned above, he believed that they reﬂect a ḥāl—in
the case of agents of ‘acquired’ acts the feature of ‘being powerful’ (kawnuhu qādi-
ran). The ḥāl is, according to al-Bāqillānī, caused by the agent’s power, and it is
precisely this feature that distinguishes him from compelled agents, who have no
power and are consequently not responsible for their doing.
Themere distinction between powerful agents and others who are not did not,
by itself, sufﬁciently explain why acts created byGod should be considered as ours.
Al-Bāqillānī addressed this issue by claiming that it is by virtue of their power that
agents are related (yataʿallaqu) to their ‘acquired’ acts. Drawing a parallel to the
relation between sensual perception and objects perceived, he argued that acts
do not have to be created by man himself in order to suppose a relation between
his power and his acts. Finally, al-Bāqillānī adds a further explanation as to how
man’s power affects his acting. In this approach, he speciﬁcally addresses the
question of man’s individual accountability. He appears to be aware of the logical
problem that man can hardly be held responsible for the existence of acts if he does
not create them himself. Al-Bāqillānī therefore proposes an alternative solution
as to what is subject to moral assessment in our acting. He suggests that man
determines an attribute of his ‘acquired’ acts by virtue of his power, and that it is
to this very attribute that God’s command, prohibition, reward, and punishment
relate (Thiele in press).
While al-Bāqillānī was primarily active in Baghdad, the centre of the Ab-
basid caliphate, Ashʿarite doctrines were simultaneously promoted in the east-
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ern lands by his two towering contemporaries: with Ibn Fūrak and al-Isfarāʾīnī,
Khurāsān, and speciﬁcally the city of Nīsābūr, became an important centre of
Ashʿarite teaching. Yet al-Bāqillānī signiﬁcantly contributed to the transmission
of Ashʿarism towards the Islamic west, at least indirectly. In the Maghrib, the
ﬁrst local tradition of Ashʿarite teaching arose in Kairouan, one of the earliest
and most important intellectual hubs in the region. It would seem that one of
the major reasons behind the wider approval of Ashʿarism was al-Bāqillānī’s ad-
herence to Mālikism, the predominant school of law in the western Islamic lands.
His writings were transmitted by his own students, including Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-
Azdī und Abū ʿImrān al-Fāsī, who settled in the North African city. Alongside
al-Bāqillānī’s theological works, Ibn Fūrak’s Mushkil al-ḥadīth is known to have
been transmitted to Kairouan by representatives of this generation (Idris 1953;
Idris 1954; Zahrī 2011).
While the dissemination of Ashʿarite doctrines was very successful, none of
the school’s representatives of this generation achieved the same reputation as
al-Bāqillānī, Ibn Fūrak, or al-Isfarāʾīnī. However, two comprehensive theologi-
cal compendia composed at that time have come down to us and provide some
insight into Ashʿarite teaching in this historical phase. The ﬁrst work was written
by Abū Isḥāq al-Isfarāʾīnī’s student ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī (429/1037)—the
later teacher of the famous mystic Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī (d. 465/1074)—who
hailed from Nīsābūr: al-Baghdādī’s Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn (al-Baghdādī, Uṣūl) appears
do be rather conservative in the sense that he primarily relies on such early author-
ities as al-Ashʿarī himself, or even the pre-Ashʿarite Ibn Kullāb (d. c. 240/854)
(Allard 1965: 316; Madelung 1987: 331).
The author of the second work is Abū Jaʿfar al-Simnānī (d. 444/1052). He
was al-Bāqillānī’s disciple and, incidentally, a Ḥanaﬁte. This is quite unusual,
since Ḥanaﬁtes rather tended to be critical of Ashʿarism. Al-Simnānī completed
his studies in Baghdad before he was appointed Qāḍī of Aleppo and later of Mo-
sul. The above-mentioned theological summa from his pen is entitled al-Bayān
ʿan uṣūl al-īmān wa-l-kashf ʿan tamwīhāt ahl al-ṭughyān (al-Simnānī, Bayān; see also Gi-
maret 1997a). It is the only work by al-Simnānī that is known to have survived.
The famous Andalusī Ẓāhirī scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) extensively quotes
from another, apparently comprehensive, theological work, that he only calls ‘al-
Simnānī’s book’ (Kitāb al-Simnānī ). The book is lost, but it would seem from Ibn
Ḥazm’s quotation that it was not identical with the Bayān (Schmidtke 2013: 384).
Al-Simnānī’s theological teaching is regarded as being close to that of his teacher
al-Bāqillānī.
A number of al-Simnānī’s students are known by name. The most prominent
was Abū l-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081), who hailed from al-Andalus. Al-Bājī re-
ceived his early education in the city of Cordoba. Most of his teachers in this city
were trained in Kairouan and some of them had even a background in Ashʿarite
theology. At the age of about 21, al-Bājī left his homeland to seek further instruc-
tion in the Islamic east. He spent several years in theḤijāz and Baghdad, studying
with Ibn Fūrak’s disciple Abū Bakr al-Muṭṭawaʿī and the prominent specialist in
Shāﬁʿite legal methodology, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083),
who had also studied with al-Bāqillānī. Al-Bājī spent one year in Mosul attend-
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ing al-Simnānī’s study circle, where he was trained in Ashʿarite theology, before
he continued travelling to Aleppo. There he was appointed judge, an ofﬁce he
exercised for a period of one year, before he eventually returned to al-Andalus
(Turki 1973: 59–70; Fierro 2004).
Our extant sources do not allow us to draw a detailed picture of al-Bājī’s the-
ological teaching. Yet he must have played a central role in the dissemination of
Ashʿarism in Islamic Spain. Indeed, Ashʿarite works already circulated before al-
Bājī, but he appears to have signiﬁcantly increased the amount of available texts.
In addition, he contributed to the establishment of kalām, which was by his time
a rather insigniﬁcant discipline in al-Andalus (Fórneas Besteiro 1977; Fórneas
Besteiro 1978; Aʿrāb 1987: 192–3; Lagardère 1994).
III. Ashʿarism under the Patronage of Niẓām al-
Mulk
A younger contemporary of al-Bājī was the famous theologian Abū l-Maʿālī al-
Juwaynī (d. 478/1085). He was born 419/1028 in the region of Nīsābūr. His fa-
ther had already played a role in Khurāsānian Ashʿarism. After his father’s death,
al-Juwaynī followed him as teacher in Nīsābūr. Yet with the Seljuq conquest of
the city in 428/1037, the Ashʿarites faced growing hostility: the vizier Tughril
Beg (d. 455/1063) implemented an anti-Shāﬁʿite policy and denounced Ashʿarite
doctrines as an illegitimate innovation (Madelung 1971: 124–30). Together with
other scholars inclined towards Ashʿarism—like the famous mystic Abū l-Qāsim
al-Qushayrī (Frank 1982b; Frank 1983b; Nguyen 2012)—al-Juwaynī ﬂed from
Nīsābūr to Baghdad. Later, in 450/1058, he travelled to the Ḥijāz and taught
at Mecca and Medina—wherefore he earned his honoriﬁc title of ‘the Imam of
the two sacred cities’ (imām al-ḥaramayn). The Seldjuqs’ attitude towards Ashʿarism
radically changed with the vizier Niẓām al-Mulk (d. 485/1092): he became a pa-
tron of Ashʿarism and founded a series of colleges in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula,
and Persia—speciﬁcally Khurāsān—to promote their teachings. He also invited
al-Juwaynī to return to Nīsābūr and to teach at a madrasa that was built speciﬁcally
for him. Niẓām al-Mulk also promoted other prominent Ashʿarite scholars like,
for example, Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Fūrakī (d. 478/1085), a grand-
son of Ibn Fūrak, who taught at the Niẓāmiyya college in Baghdad and wrote an
exposition of Ashʿarite theology entitled al-Niẓāmī fī uṣūl al-dīn (Nguyen 2013).
Among al-Juwaynī’s theological writings, two works are of particular signiﬁ-
cance. He wrote a supercommentary on al-Ashʿarī’s Lumaʿ, which is based on
al-Bāqillānī’s lost commentary. This work, entitled al-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn, has not
survived in its entirety and its largest parts have not been rediscovered.6 The sec-
6The portions of al-Juwaynī’s al-Shāmil, that have as yet been discovered, have been published in
three partial critical editions: the ﬁrst was prepared in 1959 by H. Klopfer (Juwaynī, Shāmil1) and in-
completely reproduces the text contained in a manuscript that was eventually published in its entirety
by ʿA. S. al-Nashshār in 1969 (Juwaynī, Shāmil2). Additional portions were critically edited by R. M.
Frank in 1981 (Juwaynī, Shāmil3) on the basis of another manuscript from Tehran; this manuscript
partly overlaps with the text in al-Nashshār’s edition and so Frank decided to omit from his edition
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ond text, al-Irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adilla fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād, is much shorter than the Shāmil
but complete (al-Juwaynī, Irshād). Allard (1965: 380) argued that the length of
al-Juwaynī’s works most likely decreased over the course of their relative chronol-
ogy. The Shāmil and the Irshād would then have been followed by Lumaʿ al-adilla
fī qawāʾid ahl al-summa (Allard 1968) and ﬁnally al-ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya (al-Juwaynī,
ʿAqīda).
As was the case with al-Bāqillānī, al-Juwaynī did not follow a consistent teach-
ing throughout his life. His works and the accounts of later Ashʿarite theologians
bear witness to a number or revisions and changes in al-Juwaynī’s doctrinal posi-
tions and argumentations. At some point in his career, for example, he followed
al-Bāqillānī in adopting the concept of aḥwāl and applied it to his ontological un-
derstanding of predications about God and created beings. His two longer works,
the Irshād and the Shāmil, contain sections with his approval of the notion of ḥāl.
In contrast, al-Juwaynī’s Lumaʿ and his al-ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya no longer appeal to
the theory (Allard 1965: 389–91; Gimaret 1970: 77–9; Frank 2004: 770–7).
Further contradictory positions were formulated by al-Juwaynī with regard to
the function of man’s ‘power’ (qudra) in the framework of the theory of human acts.
Just like other school representatives before him, he struggled with the question
of whether the power that accompanies man’s acts has any effect or not. While
in the Irshād al-Juwaynī completely rejects any such effectiveness, he develops in
al-ʿAqīda al-Niẓāmiyya an original theory of human acts that departs from the as-
sumption that man’s power must be effective. Al-Juwaynī’s central argument is
that otherwise God’s imposing duties and obligations (that is the notion of tak-
līf ) were no longer a tenable idea. In order to resolve this theological dilemma,
he afﬁrmed that man’s acting is caused by his power. He could consequently
argue that whatever we do is controlled by our very own selves. By this line of
reasoning, he provided an explanation why we are rightly rewarded or punished
for our acts. Nonetheless, al-Juwaynī did not give up the central Ashʿarite idea
that all happenings in the world originate in God: he maintained the claim of
God being the all-encompassing Creator by reasoning that man’s power is only
an intermediate cause, which in turn is created by God (Gimaret 1980: 120–3).
On the surface, al-Juwaynī’s theory has some similarity with two non-Ashʿarite
concepts; however, there is no clear evidence that his reasoning really depends
on them. On the one hand, Muʿtazilite theologians posited a form of acting
that produces an effect outside the agent by way of an intermediate cause. The
question whether or not this pattern also applies to God was subject to inner-
Muʿtazilite debate. On the other hand, al-Juwaynī’s theory also recalls to some
extent the notion of emanation supported by hellenizing philosophers—that is the
idea of God being the ﬁrst cause from which all other causal relations proceed.
It was precisely this alleged inﬂuence for which al-Juwaynī was blamed by the
later Ashʿarite al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) (Gimaret 1980: 127). Irrespective of
whether or not al-Juwaynī was really inspired by the idea of emanation, we know
that he was actually acquainted with, and even adopted, ideas developed by the
falāsifa—as in the case of his proof for God’s existence. While several modern
the parallel sections found in the two surviving manuscripts.
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studies have suggested a direct Avicennan inﬂuence (Davidson 1987; Rudolph
1997), Madelung has recently found signiﬁcant parallels with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-
Baṣrī’s (d. 426/1044) argumentation (Madelung 2006). Abū l-Ḥusayn was a
Muʿtazilite theologian from Baghdad, who had lived too early for there to be a
possible inﬂuence of Avicenna’s theories on his thought. Hewas, however, trained
by Christian philosophers in Baghdad and therefore familiar with their teachings
(see Chapter 9).
Al-Juwaynī’s starting point in revising the proof for God’s existence concerned
its central premiss: the traditional argument built on the assumption that the
world is created. In order to prove this assumption, it was claimed that bodies,
which make up the world, necessarily carry accidents that have a temporal exis-
tence. It was then reasoned that bodies must also have temporal existence. For
long, however, theologians did not provide any rational proof against the pos-
sibility of an inﬁnite series of created accidents: however, the upshot of this as-
sumption would have been that an eternal body could be conjoined by an inﬁnite
number of accidents, an idea that would have completely undermined the argu-
ment for creation. This deﬁciency of the traditional proof was already identiﬁed
by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. Al-Juwaynī took these reﬂections into consideration
and therefore demonstrated that whatever is created has ‘a ﬁrst’; he thereby neu-
tralized the argument of an inﬁnite series of accidents inhering in an eternal body
(Davidson 1987: 144–6; Madelung 2006: 277).
The second part of al-Juwaynī’s revision concerned the more narrow part of
the proof for God’s existence. Traditionally, it was argued that the createdness of
bodies requires a creator (muḥdith), who must be God. This conclusion was drawn
by way of analogy with our worldly experience that any such works as manufac-
ture, writing, etc. need a manufacturer, writer, etc. Yet al-Juwaynī considered in
his proof the creation of the world as a whole: he claimed that the world, instead
of being existent, could also be non-existent or come into existence at different
times. This, he went on to argue, implies its being possibly existent, which, as he
says, self-evidently implies that there must be an agent by virtue of whose arbi-
trary choice the world comes into existence at a given time instead of continuing
in a state of non-existence or of coming into existence at some other time. The
agent, he concludes, cannot be other than God. Al-Juwaynī denotes God’s choos-
ing by the verb ‘to particularize’ (ikhtaṣṣa), and, therefore, the proof is also known
as ‘particularization argument’. The central assumption that underlies the argu-
ment is an idea formulated by Avicenna, namely that the existence of the world
is contingent (mumkin al-wujūd) and that God is necessarily existent (wājib al-wujūd).
Referring to the world, al-Juwaynī in turn uses the formulations jāʾiz al-wujūd or
wujūd mumkin. Yet the core of al-Juwainī’s line of reasoning is already found in Abū
l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s teaching, who uses, however, another (less Avicennan) termi-
nology (Davidson 1987: 161–2; Rudolph 1997: 344–6; Madelung 2006: 275,
279).
From al-Juwaynī’s time, we also possess a short kalām compendium written
by his contemporary Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Maʾmūn al-Mutawallī (d.
478/1086). Al-Mutawallī was born in Nīsābūr in 426 or 427/1035 or 1036 and
studied ﬁqh in Marw, Bukhāra, and Marw al-Rūdh. He eventually moved to
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Baghdad. On the death of the Shāﬁʿite master Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī, al-Mutawallī
succeeded him as teacher at the city’s Niẓāmiyya. His theological treatise was ﬁrst
edited under the title al-Mughnī and only a little later under that of al-Ghunya. The
work heavily depends on al-Juwaynī’s Irshād (al-Mutawallī,Mughnī ; Bernand 1984;
Gimaret 1993).
Al-Juwaynī is considered as the last important representative of Ashʿarism
before the methodological shift of Ashʿarism during the sixth/twelfth century.
Yet the teaching of some later theologians remained largely unaffected by these
developments: these scholars include al-Kiyāʾ al-Ḥarrāsī (d. 504/1010–11),
Abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī (d. 512/1118), or Ḍiyāʾ al-Dīn al-Makkī (d. 559/1163–
4) (Shihadeh 2012: 434). It was in particular the works of al-Juwaynī and
al-Bāqillānī that continued to be studied for several centuries. An important
number of commentaries on such works as the Irshād and to lesser extent the
Tamhīd provide clear evidence for the ongoing impact of these two thinkers.
These works include the Sharḥ al-Irshād by al-Juwaynī’s own student Abū l-Qāsim
al-Anṣārī, a most valuable source for the study of Ashʿarism (Gilliot 2009).
Many other commentaries on al-Juwaynī’s Irshād were composed by theologians
from the Maghrib and al-Andalus, such as Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b.
Muslim al-Māzarī (d. 530/1136), ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Fazārī (d. 552/1157
or 557/1162), and Ibrāhīm b. Yūsuf Ibn Marʾa (611/1214–15) (Shihadeh 2012:
476–7).
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